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Anomalous Price Behavior Following
Earnings Surprises:




Behavioral Finance aims to explain empirical anomalies by intro-
ducing investor psychology as a determinant of asset pricing. This
study provides strong evidence that anomalous stock price behavior
following earnings announcements is due to a representativeness bias.
It investigates current and past earnings surprises and subsequent mar-
ket reaction for listed US companies over the period 1983-1999.
The results suggest that investors overreact to past earnings sur-
prises. As, on average, extreme past surprises are not conﬁrmed by
actual earnings ﬁgures, they are followed by stock market reactions of
the opposite sign. Moreover, the longer the similar earnings surprise
series, the higher the subsequent reversal.
1 Introduction
Over the last two decades, both theoretical and empirical work from the ﬁeld
of what is commonly called behavioral ﬁnance, has presented an important
challenge to the traditional ﬁnance paradigm, which states that investors
behave fully rationally. Although this appears to be very desirable, ex-
tensive theoretical and experimental evidence suggest systematic biases to
rationality.
In fact, empirical research in ﬁnance has uncovered two families of perva-
sive regularities: short-term underreaction to news, such as earnings ﬁgures,
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showing that prices reﬂect new information only slowly and long-term over-
reaction, where stock prices exhibit negative autocorrelations. Recently,
these empirical ﬁndings were integrated into theoretical models, in order to
understand if potential cognitive biases drive prices away from their ratio-
nal values. One approach explains market mispricing by positive feedback
trading (Hong and Stein, 1999), overconﬁdence (Odean, 1998; Daniel, Hirsh-
leifer, and Subrahmanyam, 1998) or anchoring and representativeness (taken
into account simultaneously by Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998)).
This study provides deep insights into how overreaction occurs within
the quarterly earnings announcement framework, by identifying representa-
tiveness as the most probable explanation of mispricing around these events.
The paper is organized as follows: the remainder of this introduction pro-
vides an short review of Behavioral Finance literature that deals with the
overreaction phenomenon and the representativeness bias. The data and
research methodology is exposed in section 2. Section 3 presents the main
results.
1.1 The overreaction phenomenon
Investors’ overreaction to information seems to be the main conclusion of the
seminal De Bondt and Thaler (1985)’s study. The authors rank all stocks
traded on the NYSE by their past three year cumulative return. Subse-
quent abnormal performance turns out to be higher for prior “losers”, that
is, stocks having experienced the poorest past performance. Over the sub-
sequent three years, the bottom decile portfolio yields an abnormal return
8% higher than that of the top decile portfolio: the prior winners. This
stock return reversal suggests that part of an initial overweighing of nega-
tive (positive) stock information, driving prices below (over) their rational
levels is subsequently corrected.
The overreaction phenomenon has been conﬁrmed several times on the
stock market (De Bondt and Thaler, 1987; Chopra, Lakonishok, and Rit-
ter, 1992), but also for international stock market indices (Chui, Titman,
and Wei, 2000; Bhojraj and Swaminathan, 2001), the gold market (Cutler,
Poterba, and Summers, 1991) and the options market (Poteshman, 2001).
Although this anomaly is now well established in empirical ﬁnance, the
2Price Behavior Following Earnings Surprises: Does Representativeness Cause Overreaction?
question of what drives overreaction still remains unanswered. Many au-
thors condition their studies on past performance (De Bondt and Thaler,
1985; Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter, 1992), current earnings (De Bondt
and Thaler, 1987) and forecasted changes in earnings (De Bondt and Thaler,
1990) and invoke the “representativeness bias” as a potential explanation,
without directly testing for it. At the time of this writing, only Poteshman
(2001) lines up representativeness and overreaction by investigating the re-
sponse of option market investors to changes in the instantaneous variance
of the underlying asset.
1.2 The representativeness heuristic
Representativeness involves assessing “[...] the probability of an uncertain
event, or a sample, by the degree to which it is similar in its essential prop-
erties to the parents population [...]”1. In other words, people rely too
heavily on information gathered from small samples (the so-called “law of
small numbers”) and underestimate statements about unconditional proba-
bility - the bayesian prior probability. As a consequence, a series of similar
information may be considered as a pattern, and extrapolated too far into
the future.
The representativeness bias may lead people to overweight recent good or
bad news when estimating future stock performance. For example, securities
which have a long record of good news may end up overpriced and experience
subsequent poor returns.
Most of the empirical studies, that deal with overreaction use past stock
returns as a proxy for prior information. In the common portfolio-approach,
stocks are ranked according to this past performance, then top and bottom
decile past performers are simply compared to each other.
The focus of this study is on what’s behind the mirror. As investors
seem to overreact to some information, that, in turn, inﬂuences stock re-
turns, it is crucial to the general acceptance of investor psychology as a
determinant of asset prices to investigate what they overreact to. This work
aims to provide evidence that overreaction is rather due to earnings infor-
1Tversky and Kahneman (1974).
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mation than to stock performance, even if both phenomena are undoubtedly
related. Its results hopefully reconcile the overreaction phenomenon and the
representativeness bias.
2 Data and methodology
2.1 Data
Financial analysts’ earnings forecasts and actual earnings were provided by
the I/B/E/S summary ﬁle. Return data is obtained from the Center of
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) for the period from January, 1st, 1983
until December, 31th, 1999.
For each quarterly earnings announcement made by any company over
this period, the consensus earnings estimate from the month preceding the
earnings announcement and the actual earnings per share (EPS) are col-
lected. To allow for a time-line analysis, EPS estimates and their actual
value for each of the 4 preceding quarters were also obtained. Moreover, for
each earnings announcement, return data for the 60 trading days following
the actual announcement date were extracted from CRSP.
Quarterly earnings, earnings announcement dates and estimates were
not available for all companies in all quarters. Also, a few companies could
not be found in CRSP and were deleted. The ﬁnal sample consists of 79 289
earnings announcements for 4 081 companies.
2.2 Measuring earnings surprises and abnormal returns
For a given quarter q, standardized unexpected earnings (SUEq) equal the
diﬀerence between actual earnings (EPSq) and the consensus estimate in the
month preceding the actual announcement (ESTq), scaled by the standard





Daily abnormal returns are computed using a size-adjusted approach:
for stock i at time t, the daily abnormal return is deﬁned by the diﬀerence
between the stock’s daily raw return and the equally weighted daily return
4Price Behavior Following Earnings Surprises: Does Representativeness Cause Overreaction?
for the size portfolio, the stock belongs to at the beginning of the year:2
ARi,t = Ri,t − Mt (2)
where Ri,t is stock i’s daily return at time t and Mt is the equally weighted
daily return for the corresponding size portfolio.






where p and q are the dates relative to the announcement date, denoted
as 0.
2.3 Portfolio Construction
As many other studies, the tests presented hereafter rely on a sort ranking
procedure. Each event (79 289 earnings announcements with valid data) is
assigned to one of ten portfolios, according to its current standardized earn-
ings surprise (SUE). Portfolio 1 is displaying the highest positive surprises
and portfolio 10 the highest negative surprises.
For those studies which focus on the reaction to a series of similar past
surprises, we repeat the portfolio formation procedure backwards. The
events of each portfolio, obtained at the ﬁrst step, are, in a second step,
ranked according to the earnings surprise of the preceding quarter and as-
signed to one of three portfolios (respectively positive, null and negative
surprises). This procedure is repeated up to 4 times, yielding, at most, one
current earnings surprise and 4 past surprises.
This selection-rank methodology allows a progressive portfolio study,
where consecutively formed portfolios only diﬀer from their parent portfolio
by the most ancient earnings surprise. This methodology allows to focus on
the impact of the number of similar past earnings surprises on the market
reaction to the most recent earnings announcement. Thereby it is possible
to identify the marginal impact of an additional (past) similar information
on the strength of representativeness.
2The size of a company is calculated at the beginning of each year, by multiplying the
share price by the number of shares outstanding. Each stock is then assigned to one of
ten size-portfolios.
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2.4 Statistical signiﬁcance of abnormal returns
Evidence regarding anomalies and/or ﬁnancial market eﬃciency is always
subject to criticism about the statistical signiﬁcance of displayed results.
The tests conducted within this study are not free of those statistical bi-
ases (no study actually is), but we aimed at limiting, as much as possible,
their consequences. For most of the tests, a non parametric signiﬁcance
test, initiated by Foster, Olsen, and Shevlin (1984), employed by Ikenberry,
Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995), Ikenberry, Rankine, and Stice (1996)
Lee (1997) and reviewed by Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) is used. It relies
on statistical signiﬁcance levels which are drawn from an empirical sample
distribution.
Statistical signiﬁcance is assessed by comparing the observed portfolio
cumulated abnormal return (hereafter CAR) with the empirical distribution
of CARs for a companion sample. The empirical distribution is generated
as follows:
1. For each event in the portfolio, randomly select one event in the parent
population.
2. Compute equal weighted CARs for the companion sample.
3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 2 500 times and rank the companion sample
CARs from the lowest to the highest to obtain the empirical distribu-
tion.
This test has several appealing properties. It does not assume normality,
it does not assume constant variance of security returns over time and it does
not assume cross-sectional independence in the residuals. Moreover, as Lyon,
Barber, and Tsai (1999) point out, unlike the conventional t-statistic, in
which the null hypothesis is that the mean CAR is zero, the null hypothesis
by approximating the empirical distribution is that the mean CAR equals
the companion mean CAR.
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3 Representativeness as a Source of Overreaction:
Empirical Results
Most studies examine abnormal returns conditionally on past performance
and report long-term reversals in abnormal stock performance. In such a
framework, empirical evidence of long-term reversals of stock returns does
not explain the phenomenon by a known psychological (cognitive) bias, be
it representativeness or any other heuristic, at most, it could be considered
consistent which such a bias.
3.1 Descriptive sample statistics and preliminary results
3.1.1 Sample wide statistics and normality
We ﬁrst consider the behavior of stock prices immediately after earnings
announcements, without conditioning on earnings surprises. Table 1 dis-
plays the sample wide average SUE (based on mean and median estimates
of earnings per share) and cumulated abnormal returns for various event
windows.
Table 1: Sample Wide Statistics for Standardized Unexpected Earnings
and Cumulated Abnormal Returns
Standard
Measure Mean deviation Skewness Kurtosis
SUEc (mean estimate) -0.0103 0.0762 -17.654 936.4
SUEc (median estimate) -0.0103 0.0762 -17.670 939.1
CAR event window (0;1) 0.0015 0.0675 0.331 18.499
CAR event window (0;3) 0.0011 0.0793 0.321 14.921
CAR event window (0;10) 0.0014 0.0890 1.824 82.901
CAR event window (0;30) 0.0077 0.1514 0.451 11.307
CAR event window (0;60) 0.0115 0.2107 0.307 7.375
The table above displays sample wide statistics for surprise indicators and abnormal returns
for 79 289 quarterly earnings announcements. SUEc denotes the current quarter standard-
ized earnings surprise and CAR denotes the cumulated abnormal return for a speciﬁc event
window.
On average, standardized unexpected earnings are negative (−0.0103),
indicating analysts’ optimism: their estimates globally overshot the actual
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ﬁgures. Despite this fact, CARs appear to be slightly positive for all event
windows up to 10 days after the earnings announcement. For larger windows
(30 and 60 days), cumulated abnormal returns are respectively 0.77% and
1.15%. K-S statistics calculated for each variable (and not reported for
simplicity) show that normality can be rejected for all variables at the 0.1
percent level.
3.1.2 Market reaction to current earnings surprises
It is well documented that investors essentially react to unexpected earnings.
We followed the widely used portfolio-study approach, initiated by Ball and
Brown (1968), and formed 10 portfolios based on the current earnings sur-
prise, denoted SUEc. Portfolio 1 contains the events with the highest pos-
itive earnings surprise, portfolio 10 the highest negative earnings surprises.
The abnormal return of a given portfolio is the equal weighted average ab-
normal return of those events, which constitute the portfolio. We computed
abnormal return statistics for several event windows, shown in table 2.
Our test statistics indicate that the stock price adjusts, on average, in
the direction of the recent earnings surprise. For portfolios which exhibit
negative surprises, that is, portfolios 6 to 10, CARs for all event windows
are negative. These abnormal returns are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero3
and, with few exceptions, increasing in the average earnings surprise of the
portfolio. For example, the bottom decile portfolio, which exhibits a negative
SUEc equal to −0.1310, yields a negative cumulated abnormal return of
−1.66% for the day following the announcement date (event window A) and
−1.41% over the ﬁrst three trading days. Portfolio 9, displaying a smaller
negative surprise (−0.0334) also experiences a smaller market reaction: on
average −1,28% on the ﬁrst trading day and −1.66% over the ﬁrst three
trading days. Conversely, positive surprise portfolios (portfolios 1 to 4)
exhibit positive CARs, that increase with the average standardized earnings
surprise of the portfolio.
These preliminary results conﬁrm two well-known phenomena. First,
the market reaction captured by the cumulated abnormal returns is not im-
3For these preliminary statistics, displayed signiﬁcance levels were computed using
conventional t-tests.
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Table 2: Cumulated Abnormal Returns Following Earnings Surprises
Event Windows A B C
Portfolio SUEc (0;1) (0;3) (0;60)
1 0.0588 2.33%∗∗∗∗∗ 2.25%∗∗∗∗∗ 4.31%∗∗∗∗∗
2 0.0195 1.67%∗∗∗∗∗ 1.52%∗∗∗∗∗ 2.84%∗∗∗∗∗
3 0.0103 0.86%∗∗∗∗∗ 0.74%∗∗∗∗∗ 1.52%∗∗∗∗∗
4 0.0044 0.49%∗∗∗∗∗ 0.33%∗∗∗∗∗ −0.14%
5 0.0000 0.04% −0.19%∗ 0.08%
6 −0.0039 −0.06% −0.17% −0.62%∗∗∗
7 −0.0098 −0.57%∗∗∗∗∗ −0.59%∗∗∗∗∗ −1.16%∗∗∗∗∗
8 −0.0174 −0.87%∗∗∗∗∗ −0.81%∗∗∗∗∗ −1.84%∗∗∗∗∗
9 −0.0334 −1.28%∗∗∗∗∗ −1.27%∗∗∗∗∗ −1.96%∗∗∗∗∗
10 −0.1310 −1.66%∗∗∗∗∗ −1.41%∗∗∗∗∗ −1.93%∗∗∗∗∗
The table shows cumulated abnormal returns (CAR) for diﬀerent event windows, (the an-
nouncement data being day 0) for 10 portfolios, formed based on the recent standardized
earnings surprise (SUEc). Latter is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the earnings estimate
from the month preceding the earnings announcement and the actual earnings per share
value, scaled by the standard deviation of the estimate. The daily abnormal return a given
stocks is deﬁned as the daily raw return of that stock minus the equal weighted average
return of the size portfolio, this stock belongs to at the beginning of the year.
The symbols ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗, ∗∗∗∗ and ∗∗∗∗∗ indicate that the measure is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero at, respectively, the 10%, 5%, 1%, 0.5% and 0.1% level, assuming a two-tailed test.
mediate: CARs for event window D (0;60) are generally greater than those
for short-term windows A (0;1) or B (0;3), denoting a progressive reaction
to the earnings information. Second, the market reaction to earnings an-
nouncements seems to be too extreme on the ﬁrst trading day, which is
shown by the fact that for non-null surprises (portfolios 1 to 4 and 7 to
10), the abnormal return for day 1 exceeds (in absolute value) the cumu-
lated abnormal return over the ﬁrst three days, conﬁrming the presence of
“momentum” after earnings announcements.4
3.2 Evidence of representativeness behind overreaction to
earnings surprises
While our preliminary results tend to conﬁrm existing evidence of overre-
action and underreaction for diﬀerent time horizons, we focus speciﬁcally
4As our study does not address these issues, we did not compute any signiﬁcance level,
nor did we investigate further.
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on representativeness. If such a bias aﬀects investors and, consequently, ﬁ-
nancial markets, we would ﬁnd evidence for two related phenomena. First,
statistical results would indicate a market’s overreaction to some disclosed
information. Second, the overreaction will be increasing in the extent to
which the series of similar information is long. The tests presented here-
after address the question wether representativeness is one of the causes of
overreaction.
3.2.1 Market Reaction Conditionally on the Past Earnings Sur-
prise
Investors that exhibit representativeness extrapolate their information too
far into the future. As, on average, these extreme expectations are not con-
ﬁrmed by actual ﬁgures, there should be periodical corrections. Especially
after high surprises, one could expect investors to overestimate future earn-
ings surprises. On average, important surprises should be followed, at the
date of subsequent earnings announcement, by a correction of the initial
overreaction, that is, by CARs of the opposite sign.
We formed 10 portfolios based on the standardized earnings surprise
preceding our event study period, SUEc−1. Results are presented in table 3.
The results displayed in table 3 are consistent with the overreaction /
representativeness hypothesis. It seems that investors rely to heavily on
the information carried by the past earnings surprise. After an important
positive surprise (SUEc−1 = 0.0548 for portfolio 1) they are deceived, on av-
erage, by the recent earnings ﬁgures. For this portfolio, cumulated abnormal
returns computed over the period following the recent earnings announce-
ment are negative, yielding −0.66% the ﬁrst trading day and even −1.91%
over the 60 ﬁrst trading days after the announcement.
For non null-surprise portfolios, computed CARs are of the opposite sign
to the past earnings surprise, and generally signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the
mean value of a randomly generated sample wide empirical distribution.
Thus, a positive (negative) surprise, generating an immediate and extreme
positive (negative) market reaction, is, on average, followed by a reversal,
that is, negative (positive) abnormal returns at the time of the subsequent
earnings announcement.
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Table 3: Market Reaction Conditional on the Preceding Earnings Surprise
A B C D
Portfolio SUEc−1 (0;1) (0;3) (0;30) (0;60)
1 0.0548 −0.66% −0.92% −1.21% −1.91%
2 0.0181 −0.49% −0.64% −0.61% −0.74%
3 0.0102 −0.06% −0.24% −0.23% −0.44%
4 0.0042 −0.01% −0.15% −0.09% −0.14%
5 0.0000 0.12% −0.01% 0.57% 0.31%
6 −0.0040 0.18% 0.11% 0.67% 0.53%
7 −0.0098 0.46%∗∗∗∗ 0.54%∗∗∗∗ 1.27%∗∗ 1.32%
8 −0.0171 0.10% 0.22% 0.59% 0.65%
9 −0.0319 0.57%∗∗∗∗ 0.65%∗∗∗∗ 1.43%∗∗∗∗ 1.32%
10 −0.1214 0.66%∗∗∗∗ 0.78%∗∗∗∗ 1.35%∗∗∗ 1.32%
The table shows cumulated abnormal returns for 10 portfolios formed according to the preceding
quarter standardized earnings surprise (SUEc−1) for diﬀerent event windows. Each window A, B,
C et D displays, in braces, the period (start date, end date) , the announcement day being denoted
day 0.
The symbols ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗, and ∗∗∗∗ indicate that the measure is signiﬁcantly higher than, respectively,
90%, 95%, 99%, and 99,5% of a sample-wide empirical distribution.
The symbols , ,, and  indicate that the measure is signiﬁcantly lower than, respectively,
90%, 95%, 99%, and 99,5% of a sample wide empirical distribution.
3.2.2 Market reaction to null surprises
To ascertain wether these results are due to investors misperception of earn-
ings surprises or a negative autocorrelation between consecutive SUEs, we
restrained our tests to those events that display a recent null surprise. We
rely on the rank-selection methodology used for table 2 and limit our sam-
ple to events contained in portfolio 5. For these earnings announcements,
mean standardized unexpected earnings equals zero and cumulated abnor-
mal returns are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. If any subset of this
sample exhibits signiﬁcant CARs, then they might be related to previous
information sets, such as past earnings surprises.
We report CARs for events of this subsample, sorted and ranked into
10 portfolios based on past earnings surprise SUEc−1, in table 4. As all
events display, on average, a recent null surprise, there should be no signif-
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icant market reaction to this recent announcement. However, extreme past
surprise portfolios exhibit a strong correction pattern: cumulated abnormal
returns, globally negative for prior positive surprises. For example, top prior
surprise decile (SUEc−1 = 0.0412) yields an abnormal return of −0.84% for
the ﬁrst trading day (event window A), −1.26% over the ﬁrst three days
(event window B) and even a −2.22% over the 60 trading days following the
earnings announcement (event window D).
Table 4: Market Reaction Conditional on the Preceding Earnings Sur-
prise for Recent Null Surprise Events
A B C D
Portfolio SUEc−1 (0;1) (0;3) (0;30) (0;60)
1 0.0412 −0.84% −1.26% −2.07% −2.22%
2 0.0161 −1.68% −2.07% −2.24% −2.26%
3 0.0100 0.20% 0.33% −0.39% −1.31%
4 0.0040 −0.23% −0.65% −1.04% −0.61%
5 0.0000 0.03% −0.09% 0.16% −0.07%
6 0.0000 −0.04% −0.54% −0.70% −0.95%
7 −0.0056 0.63%∗∗ 0.38%∗ −0.39% −1.35%
8 −0.0101 0.62%∗∗ 0.58%∗∗ 1.98%∗∗∗ 2.37%∗∗∗∗
9 −0.0196 0.67%∗∗ 0.70%∗∗ 2.55%∗∗∗∗ 3.46%∗∗∗∗
10 −0.0765 0.72%∗∗ 0.49%∗∗ 0.64% −1.06%
The table displays cumulated abnormal returns (CAR) for 10 portfolios, that were formed
based on past standardized unexpected earnings SUEc−1. This portfolio constitution was
restrained to events that exhibit a recent null surprise. CAR were computed for diﬀerent
event windows, denoted A, B, C, and D.
The symbols ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗, and ∗∗∗∗ indicate that the measure is signiﬁcantly higher than,
respectively, 90%, 95%, 99%, and 99,5% of the empirical distribution generated from sub-
sample portfolio 5.
The symbols , ,, and  indicate that the measure is signiﬁcantly lower than, respec-
tively, 90%, 95%, 99%, and 99,5% of the empirical distribution generated from subsample
portfolio 5.
We ﬁnd a similar pattern for past negative surprises. With a notable ex-
ception for portfolio 10, important negative surprises are followed by positive
CARs at the time of the subsequent earnings announcement, as document
portfolios 8 and 9. For the latter, the past surprise SUEc−1 equals −0.0196.
Despite a recent null surprise, cumulated abnormal returns subsequent to
the recent announcement turn out to be signiﬁcantly positive, for all event
windows. While the ﬁrst trading day abnormal return is “only” 0.67% (event
window A), the event window D displays an impressive 3.46%. More gener-
12Price Behavior Following Earnings Surprises: Does Representativeness Cause Overreaction?
ally, CARs for computed event windows decrease in past surprises.
For extreme prior surprises (portfolios 1, 2, 8, and 9), most of the cu-
mulated abnormal returns displayed in table 4 are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (at
indicated signiﬁcance levels) from those of the entire null surprise sample
(portfolio 5 of a preceding sort ranking step). These results indicate that
stocks with prior important surprises experience an important reversal when
subsequent earnings are announced. Even if latter equal analysts’ estimates,
thus displaying a recent null-surprise, investors feel disappointed. Their ex-
treme beliefs, due to an extrapolation of an important past surprise (and
known as representativeness) are not conﬁrmed by actual ﬁgures.
3.2.3 Progressive construction of representativeness
The results presented above indicate that an extreme earnings surprise is
followed, at the time of the subsequent earnings announcement, by a mar-
ket reaction in the opposite direction to the initial surprise. These ﬁndings
suggest the presence of investors’ overreaction to earnings surprises. If this
overreaction is due to representativeness, then investors would not only ex-
trapolate an earnings surprise into the future (and end up disappointed
when the subsequent actual earnings ﬁgures are announced), but also mis-
react more heavily to a series of similar surprises. Hence, we expect the
reversal to be more pronounced for event with long series of good or bad
earnings surprises.
To capture the impact of a series of similar earnings surprises, we used
the sequential sort-ranking procedure, described at point 2.3. As for the
previous study, we used all null-surprise events (recent-surprise-portfolio 5)
and ranked them according to the most recent past standardized unexpected
earnings (SUEc−1). We formed three equals sized portfolios (which could
be understood as positive, null, and negative c−1 surprise portfolios). Each
of those portfolios is divided again into three subportfolios, based on the
earnings surprises, that lies two quarters behind (SUEc−2). We repeat this
procedure until we have 5 consecutive quarters (SUEc until SUEc−4). This
procedure identiﬁes events with a series of similar past earnings surprises,
while keeping the most recent surprise SUEc close to zero.
Results are reported in table 5. They are consistent with the repre-
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Table 5: Market Reaction Conditional on Previous Earnings Surprises
Sample A B C D
Portfolio SUE c Size (0;1) ( 0;3) (0;30) (0;60)




















5 −0.0001 4673 −0.02% −0.23% 0.04% −0.13%


















The table shows that cumulated abnormal returns, computed for diﬀerent event windows, are in-
creasing in the length of a past earnings surprise series. All portfolios are formed sequentially starting
from the current null surprise (portfolio 5), then forming, at each step, 3 portfolios based on the
preceding standardized unexpected earnings.
Cumulated abnormal returns are computed for the ﬁrst trading day after the announcement (event
window A), the period covering the ﬁrst three trading days (B), 30 trading days (C), and trading 60
days following the earnings announcement.
The symbols ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗, and ∗∗∗∗ indicate that the measure is signiﬁcantly higher than, respectively,
90%, 95%, 99%, and 99,5% of the empirical distribution generated from subsample portfolio 5.
The symbols , ,, and  indicate that the measure is signiﬁcantly lower than, respectively,
90%, 95%, 99%, and 99,5% of the empirical distribution generated from subsample portfolio 5.
sentativeness hypothesis. In addition to a correction period consecutively to
recent earnings announcement, it appears that this correction is stronger for
a long series of similar consecutive earnings surprises. For example, port-
folio denoted 5,1,1,1,1, having experienced a series of four positive past
surprises and a current null surprise, displays a negative cumulated abnor-
mal return of −3.07% for the ﬁrst trading day, −4.73% over the ﬁrst 30, and
−11.18% over the ﬁrst 60 trading days. This portfolio outperforms portfolio
5,1,1,1, with only three consecutive positive past earnings surprises over
nearly all event windows. Recall that those earnings announcements are
actually null surprises, that is, the current earnings ﬁgures match, on av-
erage, analysts’ estimates. Similar results are obtained for portfolios with
prior negative surprises; thus displaying positive abnormal returns after the
current null-surprise.
These results indicate that the longer the series of similar earnings sur-
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prises (Standardized Unexpected Earnings in our study), the stronger the
subsequent correction. This evidence is consistent with the idea that repre-
sentativeness causes investors to overreact more heavily to a series of similar
information. If these beliefs are not conﬁrmed by actual earnings ﬁgures,
the markets experiences a strong reversal. Latter is increasing in the length
of the series of similar earnings surprises.
4 Conclusions
Psychological theory and experimental studies have establish that investors
make mistakes in forming their beliefs. Behavioral Finance argues that tak-
ing into account cognitive biases such as overconﬁdence, anchoring, or repre-
sentativeness could provide a better understanding of empirical anomalies,
such as under- or overreaction.
Our study indicates that anomalous stock price behavior around earn-
ings announcements, which is consistent with overreaction, could be based
on representativeness. In fact, our tests provide strong evidence that im-
portant past earnings surprises are followed, at the time of the subsequent
earnings announcement, by cumulated abnormal returns of the opposite sign
to the initial reaction. These ﬁndings suggest that the stock market initially
extrapolates the recent earnings surprise and hence overreacts to earnings
surprises. As on average, these extreme expectations are not conﬁrmed by
subsequent earnings ﬁgures, investors feel deceived and the stocks experi-
ence a return reversal. Consistent with the representativeness hypothesis,
series of similar surprises are more heavily extrapolated and lead to more
important subsequent reversals.
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